Illinois Delegation Members Continue Questioning of NGA Director Over Security of NGA Site
[WASHINGTON, D.C.] – The bipartisan, bicameral Congressional Delegation representing Southwestern Illinois today questioned the security of the North St. Louis site which was recently announced to be the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)’s preferred location for its West Campus (NGA-West). The additional questions were raised following a meeting last week between the Illinois delegation members and NGA Director Robert Cardillo.
U.S. Senators Dick Durbin (D-IL) and Mark Kirk (R-IL), and U.S. Representatives Mike Bost (R-IL), John Shimkus (R-IL) and Rodney Davis (R-IL) signed on to today’s letter which took issue with the fact that while the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) claims that each site met basic security requirements, an independent analysis by the risk analysis firm Command Consulting Group asserts that NGA would have to waive compliance with the Department of Defense minimum parameters due to encroachment and the lack of standoff distance to pursue the North St. Louis site.
“We continue to have grave concerns that the North St. Louis site does not meet the necessary mission security requirements, especially in terms of standoff distance,” the Illinois members wrote. “These minimum requirements are considered only to provide low or very low applicable levels of force protection. We question why low or very low levels of protection are considered adequate for a vital national security facility and the people who work there, and whether such standards comply with applicable Intelligence Community policies.”
Text of today’s letter is below.
May 16, 2016
Mr. Robert Cardillo
Director
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
7500 GEOINT Drive
Springfield, Virginia 22150
Dear Mr. Cardillo:
Thank you for meeting with us and representatives for our local communities to discuss the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s Agency Preferred Alternative (APA) for its West Campus (NGA-West). Unfortunately, a number of deep disagreements remain. In particular, we continue to have grave concerns that the North St. Louis site does not meet the necessary mission security requirements, especially in terms of standoff distance. We have raised these concerns throughout the public comment period. Our discussion left us with more questions than answers. We request that you respond in writing justifying NGA’s security assessment prior to issuing the Record of Decision and within seven calendar days of the receipt of this letter.
NGA-West employees, our warfighters, and the American taxpayers deserve to have an unshakable assurance that the final NGA-West site chosen has been properly assessed and selected in accordance with the highest applicable security standards. As we have pointed out multiple times, while the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) claims that each site met basic security requirements, an independent analysis by the risk analysis firm Command Consulting Group asserts that NGA would have to waive compliance with the Department of Defense minimum parameters due to encroachment and the lack of standoff distance to pursue the North St. Louis site.
Once again, we request your response to our specific critiques, as well as those presented in the Command Consulting Group risks analysis report produced by a retired Air Force colonel and a United States Secret Service veteran with a combined fifty-three years of experience in antiterrorism and force protection standards for federal facilities. They thoroughly evaluated each site’s potential vulnerabilities to improvised explosive devices transported by vehicles or individuals, Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) for antiterrorism force protection, direct fire weapons, covert surveillance by adversaries, and dangers to employees while traveling.
The FEIS does not mention standoff distance or antiterrorism and force protection standards, which is in stark contrast with the lengthy discussion contained in NGA-East’s FEIS prior to the selection of Fort Belvoir. As you are aware, these standoff distances and force protection standards for military construction are outlined in UFC 4-010-01, Department of Defense Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for New and Existing Buildings, Appendix B (issued October 8, 2003 and updated January 22, 2007). Table B-1 of those standards shows the minimum standoff distance requirements. These minimum requirements are considered only to provide low or very low applicable levels of force protection. We question why low or very low levels of protection are considered adequate for a vital national security facility and the people who work there, and whether such standards comply with applicable Intelligence Community policies.
Thank you for your consideration, and we look forward to your timely response to this critical element in your decision.
Sincerely,
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